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Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms 
for Cooperation
Jeffrey R. Stevens, Fiery A. Cushman, and Marc D. Hauser
Primate Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Department of Psychology,  
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Abstract  
Cooperation is common across nonhuman animal taxa, from the hunting of 
large game in lions to the harvesting of building materials in ants. Theorists 
have proposed a number of models to explain the evolution of cooperative be-
havior. These ultimate explanations, however, rarely consider the proximate 
constraints on the implementation of cooperative behavior. Here we review 
several types of cooperation and propose a suite of cognitive abilities required 
for each type to evolve. We propose that several types of cooperation, though 
theoretically possible and functionally adaptive, have not evolved in some an-
imal species because of cognitive constraints. We argue, therefore, that future 
modeling efforts and experimental investigations into the adaptive function of 
cooperation in animals must be grounded in a realistic assessment of the psy-
chological ingredients required for cooperation. Such an approach can account 
for the puzzling distribution of cooperative behaviors across taxa, especially the 
seemingly unique occurrence of cooperation observed in our own species.
1. Introduction
Vampire bats regurgitate blood to others despite the possibility of dying if 
three days elapse without consuming blood. Ground squirrels give alarm calls 
even though they alert predators to their own presence. Cleaner fish enter the 
mouths of their hosts to remove parasites even at risk of being eaten. Florida 
scrub jays often stay at home with their parents, foregoing the benefits of per-
sonal reproduction to help rear their younger siblings. These cases of cooper-
ation have generated a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical inter-
est over the past several decades, primarily focusing on adaptive accounts of 
cooperative behaviors. This adaptive perspective has been fruitful; indeed, the 
crowning glory of the sociobiological revolution beginning in the 1960s has 
been the overwhelming empirical support for its theoretical predictions tar-
geted at adaptive accounts of social behavior (Alcock 2001, Hamilton 1964, 
Trivers 2002, Williams 1966, Wilson 1975). The adaptive view, however, fails to 
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fully account for the empirical data on cooperative behavior. This weakness, in 
our opinion, results from a strictly ultimate perspective that ignores proximate 
mechanisms of cooperation. Here, we argue that evolutionary puzzles concern-
ing the phylogenetic distribution of cooperative behaviors can be resolved by 
unraveling the psychological machinery upon which they depend.
We first discuss the adaptive challenges of cooperation and briefly review 
potential solutions. We then describe the empirical evidence for the different 
solutions, demonstrating that some types of cooperation occur much less fre-
quently in nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) than theory predicts. Fi-
nally, we introduce the idea of cognitive constraints on cooperation to explain 
the limited taxonomic scope of certain kinds of cooperation. We conclude by 
discussing how a psychologically informed approach to cooperation opens a 
new set of questions, guides how we design our experiments, and helps re-
solve apparently contradictory findings concerning the uniqueness of human 
cooperation.
2. The Problem Of Cooperation
We define cooperation as any behavior that provides a benefit to an individ-
ual other than the cooperator (where benefit is defined as an increase in repro-
ductive success). Given the generally accepted Darwinian assumption that be-
havior evolves via natural selection, cooperation poses an apparent problem: 
What selective pressure favors individuals who provide benefits to other indi-
viduals? A number of models address this problem, of which we review four: 
mutualism, kin selection, reciprocity, and sanctioning (for more complete treat-
ment, see Dugatkin 1997).
2.1 Mutualism 
The simplest explanation for cooperative behavior is that it provides direct 
benefits to the cooperator, in addition to other individuals. This model of coop-
erative behavior is termed mutualism (Brown 1983, West Eberhard 1975). Any 
individual that defects (i.e., does not cooperate) in mutualistic situations will, 
by definition, do worse than a cooperator; therefore, in the absence of a temp-
tation to defect, cooperation provides the best option. Importantly, mutualism 
does not depend on the identity of your partner and, therefore, can occur be-
tween any members of the same species and even members of different species 
(Boucher 1985, Herre et al. 1999).
2.2. Kin Selection 
Cooperation that does not yield the direct benefits of mutualism poses an even 
deeper evolutionary paradox: altruism. Why would an individual help others, 
especially at a cost to itself? Kin selection provided the first clear theoretical solu-
tion to the paradox of altruism. Although introduced by Darwin (1859), Hamil-
ton (1964) first mathematically formalized kin selection as a mechanism to main-
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tain cooperation among genetic relatives. He suggested that individuals may bias 
cooperation toward their genetic relatives because it helps propagate their own 
genes. What looks altruistic from an individual’s perspective actually serves self-
interest from the gene’s view (Dawkins 1976). Individuals share a certain propor-
tion of their genes (r—the coefficient of relatedness) with relatives due to com-
mon descent. If the benefits to kin discounted by this coefficient of relatedness 
outweigh the costs of helping, altruism toward kin can evolve.
2.3. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity, in which individuals pay a short-term cost of cooperation for the 
future benefit of a social partner’s reciprocated cooperation, has probably been 
the most celebrated type of cooperation. Reciprocity aims to explain cooper-
ative behavior in a unique type of social interaction termed the prisoner’s di-
lemma (Flood 1958, Rapoport & Chammah 1965). The key aspects of the pris-
oner’s dilemma are (a) cooperation maximizes the total payoff to everyone 
involved in the interaction (mutual cooperation provides more benefits than 
mutual defection); however, (b) any individual will receive a higher personal 
payoff by defecting, so a sizable temptation to cheat exists (Figure 1a). Pursu-
ing unilateral cooperation in this game is not an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(Maynard Smith 1982, Maynard Smith & Price 1973).
Trivers (1971) suggested that reversing roles as donor and recipient of altru-
ism may reduce the temptation to defect because individuals are investing in 
future cooperation. Reciprocity can stabilize cooperation if the following con-
ditions are met: (a) the benefits to the recipient outweigh the costs to the donor, 
(b) individuals interact repeatedly, and (c) individuals recognize partners so 
they can detect cheaters. When the fitness payoffs sum over a series of interac-
tions with the same partner, reciprocal strategists can reap the benefits of mu-
tual cooperation (Figure 1b). The reciprocal strategy tit-for-tat (TFT), in which a 
player starts out cooperating and copies its opponent’s behavior in previous in-
teractions, can successfully invade and dominate simulated populations of so-
cial partners engaging in prisoner’s dilemma games, winning out over many 
alternative behavioral strategies (Axelrod 1984, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). If 
the probability of interacting again exceeds a critical level, a reciprocal strategy 
can maintain cooperation.
2.4. Sanctioning 
Punishing defection can impose enough costs to offset the temptation to cheat 
and, like reciprocity, can elicit future cooperation (Boyd & Richerson 1992, 
Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995a). Punishment involves energetic costs and, 
when accomplished by aggression, also involves the cost of risked injury. Pun-
ishment can only be an adaptive behavior at the individual level of selection, 
therefore, when it successfully elicits cooperative behavior directed strictly at 
the punisher (Gardner & West 2004). In this manner punishment resembles 
reciprocity, which should occur when it elicits cooperative behavior directed 
strictly at the reciprocator.
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Another form of sanctioning is harassment. Whereas punishment penal-
izes past behavior with the hope of future reward, harassment penalizes pres-
ent behavior with the hope of present reward. For instance, if a defector has 
consumed 100% of a food resource, a punisher could punish the defector in the 
hope of obtaining 50% of the food resource in some future interaction; how-
ever, if a defector is in the process of consuming a food resource, a harasser 
could impose costs on the defector aimed at obtaining 50% of the food resource 
immediately. By harassing during defection, individuals may induce coopera-
tion, thereby providing an immediate individual benefit for the harasser, rather 
than the delayed benefit of future cooperation (Stevens & Stephens 2002).
Figure 1. Economics of cooperation. Evolutionary biologists have used the prison-
er’s dilemma as the standard model of altruistic cooperation. (a) The payoffs are struc-
tured such that a defector playing against a cooperator receives the highest payoff (T), 
mutual cooperators receive the next highest payoff (R), mutual defectors receive the 
next highest payoff (P), and cooperators playing against defectors receive the lowest 
payoff (S). Because no matter what your opponent chooses, you do better by defect-
ing (T > R, P > S), defection is the only stable strategy when playing a one-shot pris-
oner’s dilemma. (b) When iterating the game over several interactions, however, coop-
eration can stabilize (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). A population of reciprocal strategies 
playing tit-for-tat (TFT) can avoid invasion of all defectors (All-D) with a high proba-
bility of future interaction w.
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3. Evidence for Cooperation
Despite the abundance of theoretical interest in the different models of cooper-
ation, over 30 years of research on a wide variety of species, under lab and field 
conditions, reveals that some occur much more frequently in animals than oth-
ers. In particular, mutualism and kin-biased cooperation account for the vast 
majority of instances of cooperation. In stark contrast, only a handful of species 
have demonstrated reciprocity, and even within these species reciprocity oc-
curs infrequently (Hammerstein 2003, Noë 1990, Stevens & Hauser 2004). Sanc-
tioning is also inconsistently distributed across taxa; punishment appears to be 
less common than mutualism or kin selection, but harassment may occur fre-
quently, perhaps especially among primates (Stevens & Gilby 2004). Here we 
describe only a fraction of the empirical evidence for the four models of coop-
eration. The goal is to look at a few selective cases and then attempt to explain 
the patterns in light of our argument for cognitive constraints.
3.1. Mutualism 
Mutualism may be the most common form of cooperation; it occurs fre-
quently across a wide variety of taxa. Cooperative hunting provides a prime 
example described in numerous species (Dugatkin 1997, Krause & Rux-
ton 2002). Cooperative hunting provides mutualistic benefits only when the 
per capita intake rate increases with group size. Therefore, a pair of hunt-
ers would have to capture more than twice as many prey items as a solitary 
hunter. For cooperative hunting to benefit hunters, the success rate of soli-
tary hunters should be fairly low, making cooperation particularly success-
ful (Packer & Ruttan 1988). In addition to increasing the probability of cap-
ture, cooperative hunting may also reduce the individual costs of hunting 
(Creel 1997). Combined, these two mechanisms can lead to direct, immediate, 
and simultaneous fitness benefits for cooperative hunters, particularly when 
hunting small or difficult prey.
Another example of mutualism is food recruitment in ravens (Corvus corax). 
Heinrich and colleagues (Heinrich 1989, Heinrich & Marzluff 1991) observed 
that when ravens discovered animal carcasses, they often gave food calls and 
returned to communal roosts to recruit others. After ruling out reciprocity and 
kin-biased cooperation (Heinrich 1988, Parker et al. 1994), Heinrich proposed 
that the callers recruited others to prevent territory owners from monopolizing 
the food. Therefore, though it appears altruistic, recruiting actually increased 
access to an otherwise unavailable food source.
Cooperative breeders may also accrue mutualistic benefits (Woolfenden & 
Fitzpatrick 1978). Individuals help raise their younger siblings because larger 
group sizes can yield benefits such as larger territories. These territories often 
have better access to food, reduced predation risk, and space to establish their 
own territories (Clutton-Brock 2002, Cockburn 1998, Stacey & Koenig 1990). 
Some species even adopt or kidnap unrelated offspring, presumably to reap 
the benefits of increasing their group size (Connor & Curry 1995, Heinsohn 
1991, Zahavi 1990).
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3.2. Kin Selection 
Kin-biased cooperation commonly occurs in species ranging from arthropods 
to apes (Bourke 1997, Chapais & Berman 2004, Silk 2002). Darwin’s original 
paradox of altruism was motivated by the kin-biased cooperation that occurs 
in eusocial insects such as ants, bees, and wasps (Bourke 1997). In eusocial spe-
cies, individuals cooperate to care for the young, divide reproductive opportu-
nities such that only a few individuals reproduce, and have overlapping gen-
erations (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). Importantly, many individuals forego 
reproduction completely to aid in the care of their siblings. Some species even 
express haplodiploid genotypes with haploid males and diploid females. This 
results in sisters being highly related to each other (r = 3/4) but less closely re-
lated to their brothers (r = 1/4) and even their own daughters and sons (r = 
1/2); therefore, females should bias more cooperation toward other sisters. In a 
now classic study, Trivers & Hare (1976) used this unique system to test kin se-
lection in ants. They found that females matched their altruistic allocations to 
the degree of genetic relatedness: Investment in other females exceeds invest-
ment in males by three orders of magnitude (for an alternative perspective, see 
Reeve 1993).
Kin selection may be particularly powerful in cooperatively breeding spe-
cies, although it by no means accounts for all cooperative behaviors in these 
systems (Clutton-Brock 2002, Cockburn 1998, Griffin & West 2002). Kin selec-
tion theory predicts that individuals should preferentially help relatives and 
should help in proportion to their coefficient of relatedness. Reviews of the lit-
erature support this prediction, demonstrating that the probability and amount 
of help correlate with the coefficient of relatedness (Emlen 1997, Griffin & West 
2003). Griffin & West (2003) tested even stronger predictions in a meta-anal-
ysis by demonstrating that the effect of kin selection (i.e., the correlation be-
tween helping and relatedness) correlates highly with the benefit of helping. 
This meta-analysis extended the findings of Trivers & Hare (1976) to other spe-
cies, suggesting that helping scales with not only the coefficient of relatedness 
(r) but also the benefit of helping.
3.3. Reciprocity 
Many authors have reported reciprocity—the alternation of receiving costs 
and benefits—in numerous contexts including food sharing (de Waal & Berger 
2000, Hauser et al. 2003, Watts & Mitani 2002), grooming (Barrett & Henzi 2001, 
Rowell et al. 1991), predator inspection (Dugatkin 1988, Milinski 1987), and co-
alitions associated with mating opportunities (Packer 1977). Unfortunately, 
most examples of reciprocity suffer from one of two problems: (a) they have 
not been replicated, and (b) alternative explanations, such as kin selection and 
mutualism, can account for the observed reciprocal pattern.
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One of the first reported instances of reciprocity occurred in olive baboons 
(Papio anubis) (Packer 1977). Males formed coalitions in order to drive off rival 
males and gain access to reproductively active females. Packer’s analyses sug-
gested that males took turns reaping the benefits, implying evidence of reci-
procity. A subsequent study of a different population of baboons did not find 
the same reciprocal patterns (Bercovitch 1988), and a study of a closely related 
species proposes an alternative explanation. Noë (1990) suggested that male sa-
vannah baboons (Papio cyanocephalus) implemented multiplayer market strat-
egies during coalition formation. Coalition partners did not face a prisoner’s 
dilemma; rather they faced a veto game in which the coalition initiator forces 
other males to “bid” on joining the coalition. If the potential helpers did not 
join, they would not receive mating opportunities. Therefore, the coalition 
initiator can choose the partner which will take the lowest share of mating 
opportunities.
Probably the best-known putative example of reciprocity is Wilkin-
son’s (1984) study of blood sharing in vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus). In 
this study, vampire bats regurgitated blood to individuals that failed to ob-
tain blood meals on their own. The bats shared mainly with individuals with 
whom they associated, leading Wilkinson to conclude that the bats recipro-
cated. Although commonly cited as evidence for reciprocity, only 5 of the 98 
instances of sharing between individuals of known genetic relatedness in-
volved individuals less related than grandparent to grandchild (r < 0.25); 
most occurred between mother and offspring. Therefore, direct fitness bene-
fits and kin selection can account for the vast majority of sharing, leaving in-
stances of potential reciprocal sharing quite rare and possibly attributable to 
recognition errors.
Another controversial example of reciprocity is predator inspection in stick-
leback fish (Gasterosteus aculeatus) and guppies (Poecilia reticulata). Milinksi 
(1987) and Dugatkin (1988) found that when inspecting a predator fish, indi-
viduals copied their partners’ approach or retreat (the “partners” were actu-
ally mirrors that mimicked a fish either swimming with or away from the sub-
ject). These experiments elicited a flood of criticisms. In particular, the fitness 
payoffs of cooperation and defection were unclear (Connor 1996, Lazarus & 
Metcalfe 1990), and rather than reciprocating, the target fish may simply have 
preferred to stay in groups to reduce predation risk (Masters & Waite 1990, Ste-
phens et al. 1997). Minimally, we consider the stickleback and guppy work on 
reciprocity as unresolved.
Finally, we describe several cases that appear to offer viable evidence of rec-
iprocity. Hauser et al. (2003) conducted a series of experiments in which cot-
ton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) could altruistically pull a tool to give food 
to an unrelated recipient without getting any food for itself. Subjects alternated 
which partner had the opportunity to pull with a short time interval between 
trials. Tamarins pulled the tool most often for partners that always pulled and 
infrequently for partners that never pulled. The tamarins, however, cooperated 
less than 50% of the time, and as each game progressed, the amount of food 
given decreased. Tamarins, therefore, maintained a moderate level of coopera-
tion when receiving food closely followed giving food.
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Some researchers have proposed reciprocal egg swapping in simulta-
neously hermaphroditic fish (chalk bass—Serrannus tortugarum) and poly-
chaete worms (Ophryotrocha gracilis) as examples of reciprocity (Fischer 1988, 
Sella et al. 1997). These species produce both male and female gametes and, 
therefore, can both give and receive fertilizations. Because eggs cost more to 
produce, a defector could fertilize a cooperator’s eggs but offer none of its 
own, thereby avoiding costly egg production. Both the fish and worms re-
peatedly alternate depositing packets of eggs and fertilizing their opponents’ 
packets of eggs. Depositing eggs depends on the partner’s behavior because 
the interaction stops when the partner fails to deposit eggs. Reciprocal al-
logrooming in impala (Aepyceros melampus) follows a similar pattern: Indi-
viduals groom one another for short bouts and then receive grooming from 
their partner, repeatedly alternating who grooms (Hart & Hart 1992). In all 
of these examples, the small time delay between paying the cost of coopera-
tion and receiving the benefit minimizes the chance of defection. In Section 
4.2, we further discuss the significance of time in the evaluation of recipro-
cal possibilities.
3.4. Sanctioning 
Despite the theoretical interest, punishment is not well documented in an-
imals. Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995a) offered several examples of punish-
ment enforcing cooperation in animals, but we would characterize these exam-
ples as harassment because the punisher usually receives immediate benefits 
from punishing. For instance, queen paper wasps (Polistes fuscatus) attack lazy 
workers; when Reeve & Gamboa (1987) removed the queen from the colony, 
the workers stopped working. Although reported as punishment, one should 
categorize this as harassment because the queen’s aggression immediately in-
creased the activity of the workers.
Animals often impose costs on others to influence their current behavior 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995b, Stevens 2004, Wrangham 1975). For instance, 
Gilby (2004) studied the food-sharing patterns of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes). After capturing prey, the chimpanzees frequently allowed other individ-
uals to consume part of the meat. Gilby showed that harassment accounted for 
the pattern of food sharing, because harassment was costly for the food owner 
(food intake rate decreased as the number of beggars increased), owners shared 
more often when beggars harassed frequently and intensely, and when sharing 
occurred harassment levels decreased. Controlled experiments corroborated 
these findings with captive chimpanzees and extended them to other species 
such as squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis), a species that rarely cooperates 
(Stevens 2004).
Harassment may, of course, influence future as well as current coopera-
tion, suggesting that it may lead to punishment strategies. For example, when 
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discovered food, those individuals who an-
nounced their discovery by vocalizing faced fewer attacks than those individu-
als who made their discoveries in silence, apparently withholding information 
(Hauser 1992, Hauser & Marler 1993). This sanctioning imposed costs on the 
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discoverer not only in terms of potential for injury and wasted energy but also 
by reduced food intake relative to vocal discoverers. This sanctioning yielded 
an immediate benefit of accessing food, clearly qualifying it as a case of harass-
ment. In addition, these data suggest that the sanctioning may have had a pun-
ishing effect on silence, eliciting future food calls. That is, sanctioning behavior 
resulted in both immediate and future benefits. To the authors’ knowledge, no 
clear evidence in animals demonstrates that punishment influences future co-
operation in the absence of harassment.
In summary, although ample evidence of cooperation exists in the animal 
kingdom, reciprocity and punishment rarely occur in animals, especially when 
contrasted with humans (Fehr & Gächter 2002, Ostrom & Walker 2003). We 
next turn to an explanation for this taxonomic distribution.
4. Cognitive Constraints on Cooperation
Mutualism and kin selection are both theoretically well understood and em-
pirically well documented (Dugatkin 1997). By contrast, reciprocity and pun-
ishment, although theoretically feasible, do not frequently occur in animals 
(although harassment may be more widespread). Therefore, despite mod-
els purporting the evolutionary stability of all of these types of cooperation, 
some types occur much more frequently than others. Unfortunately, a strictly 
adaptive perspective has limited power to explain the frequency of mutual-
ism and kin-biased cooperation, and the rarity of reciprocity and punishment. 
A proximate perspective that keeps its eye on the ultimate problem can, how-
ever, reveal how psychological constraints limit or facilitate particular forms of 
cooperation.
The proximate approach emphasizes critical aspects of reciprocity and 
punishment that differ markedly from mutualism and kin-biased coopera-
tion. In both reciprocity and punishment, the fitness benefits associated with 
cooperation depend on the partner’s behavior: Cooperation should only oc-
cur when the partner responds by reciprocating or punishing. When this con-
tingent response occurs in the future, the temporal delay introduces cogni-
tive challenges that may constrain the emergence and stability of cooperation 
(Stevens & Gilby 2004). Animals can easily implement strategies that yield 
immediate benefits, such as mutualism and harassment, because individuals 
do not have to track benefits over time. With a time delay between cooperat-
ing and receiving return benefits, however, individuals must invest in an un-
certain future. Delayed benefits impede learning the consequences of coop-
eration, require more memory capacity for previous interactions, and trade 
off short-term fitness gains for long-term gains. Here we provide a sketch of 
our proximate perspective on cooperation, highlighting several key cognitive 
constraints as a way to distinguish mutualism, kin-biased cooperation, reci-
procity, and sanctioning.
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4.1. Cognitive Constraints on Mutualism and Kin-Biased Cooperation 
Because no temptation to cheat exists in mutualistic interactions, individuals 
should always cooperate. As a result, mutualism requires no special cognitive 
abilities above and beyond the challenges inherent in the cooperative behavior 
itself. Although Dugatkin & Alfieri (2002) contend that animals must recognize 
whether they are in a mutualistic situation, we argue that recognition is neither 
necessary for nor specific to mutualism. Kin-biased cooperation, on the other 
hand, does require additional cognitive capacities. At a minimum, it requires 
the capacity to direct cooperative actions to related individuals (Dugatkin & 
Alfieri 2002). Indeed, Hamilton’s formulation of kin selection spawned a crit-
ical series of empirical studies showing that numerous species had the ability 
to make certain kin discriminations (Fletcher & Michener 1987, Hepper 1991). 
These studies were critical in the general acceptance of kin selection.
Mechanisms of kin recognition include recognition alleles, phenotype 
matching, and spatial and familiarity cues (Hepper 1991, Sherman et al. 1997, 
Wilson 1987). The recognition allele hypothesis predicts that individuals can 
compare a particular phenotypic cue (auditory, olfactory, visual, etc.) to an in-
nately specified template (e.g., the “green beard effect”—Dawkins 1976, Ham-
ilton 1964). Such a model requires few cognitive skills other than discriminat-
ing the cue associated with relatedness. Keller & Ross (1998) suggested that fire 
ants (Solenopsis invicta) may use recognition alleles to selectively kill queens 
that do not share their genotype. Phenotypic matching occurs when an indi-
vidual compares a conspecific’s phenotypic cues to a learned template. This re-
quires specialized perceptual and computational systems that detect cues at an 
early stage to form a template, then test cues against the template to discrimi-
nate kin (Hauber & Sherman 2001). Peacocks (Pavo cristatus), golden hamsters 
(Mesocricetus auratus), and a number of other species have demonstrated phe-
notypic matching (Mateo & Johnston 2000, Petrie et al. 1999). Finally, a com-
mon alternative is to use a simple set of rules such as spatial and familiarity 
cues to discriminate kin. Often, animals may use rules such as “be nice to in-
dividuals near your home” or “help those that you grew up with” to direct the 
benefits of cooperation toward kin. These mechanisms occur regularly in a va-
riety of animal taxa.
4.2. Cognitive Constraints on Reciprocity and Punishment 
Trivers’ (1971) classic formulation of reciprocity had three requirements for 
evolutionary stability: (a) the reciprocated benefit must outweigh the immedi-
ate cost, (b) individuals must interact repeatedly, and (c) individuals must rec-
ognize each other. We contend that these requirements do not capture the cog-
nitive sophistication required for utilizing reciprocal strategies. In particular, 
the delay between the cost of a cooperative act and the benefit of reciprocated 
cooperation introduces a number of cognitive challenges. Like reciprocity, pun-
ishment can involve a delay between a costly act and a beneficial payoff, and 
in these cases it faces similar constraints. For this reason, we consider the con-
straints on reciprocity and punishment together.
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4.2.1. individual recognition  Trivers does propose individual recognition as 
a cognitive ability needed to avoid cheaters and stabilize cooperation via reci-
procity (see also Dugatkin & Alfieri 2002). Punishment also requires individual 
recognition to ensure that individuals only cooperate with punishers, thereby 
preventing punishment from benefiting nonpunishers (Gardner & West 2004). 
Therefore, the delayed, contingent response required for both reciprocity and 
punishment necessitates that individuals can distinguish different partners. 
Numerous species across the animal kingdom possess the ability to recognize 
individuals, however, so the necessity for a mechanism of individual recogni-
tion cannot explain the paucity of cooperative behavior across most nonhuman 
taxa.
4.2.2. teMPoral diScounting  Temporal discounting is the devaluing of future 
rewards, which often results in a preference for smaller, immediate rewards 
over larger, delayed rewards. Many psychologists who study discounting 
consider the prisoner’s dilemma to be analogous to the discounting problem 
(Green et al. 1995, Rachlin 2000). Individuals must choose between the imme-
diate reward of defecting and the long-term reward of cooperating. Indeed, a 
number of researchers have predicted that temporal discounting can reduce 
the value of reciprocated benefits (Frank 1988, May 1981, Trivers 1971). Ex-
perimental data on variation in human discounting and cooperation validate 
the view that a preference for immediate rewards may inhibit reciprocity. Dis-
counting correlates with cooperation such that individuals who prefer imme-
diacy cooperate less frequently (Harris & Madden 2002). In parallel, blue jays 
(Cyanocitta cristata) show stable cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma only fol-
lowing a reduction in their preference for immediacy resulting from accumu-
lating payoffs over several trials (Stephens et al. 2002). Therefore, if animals 
highly discount future rewards (Figure 2; Mazur 1987, Richards et al. 1997, Ste-
vens et al. 2005), the immediate benefits of defections may outweigh the future 
reciprocated benefits.
4.2.3. MeMory  Limitations in memory decay, interference, and capacity can 
also constrain the frequency of reciprocity and punishment. Models of for-
getting predict exponential or power functions (Sikstrom 2002, White 2001, 
Wixted 2004), because memories decay rapidly over time (Figure 3). Therefore, 
longer time intervals between cooperative acts may make reciprocity and pun-
ishment more difficult. Even with short time delays between cooperative inter-
actions and few distractions, every potential new partner increases the compu-
tational load of tracking debts owed, favors given, and costs imposed. Keeping 
score of reciprocal obligations and punishment with multiple individuals may 
place a computationally intensive burden on memory systems. Although few 
studies examine learning and memory constraints in animal cooperation, hu-
man studies suggest that these constraints can pose challenges for maintaining 
stable cooperative relationships (Milinski & Wedekind 1998).
Existing evidence demonstrates the importance of the time delay between 
paying the costs of cooperation and receiving the benefits. In the previously 
described examples of food sharing in tamarins, reciprocal egg swapping 
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in fish and worms, and reciprocal allogrooming in impala, the time delay is 
minimal. This greatly reduces the cognitive demands for reciprocity: Individ-
uals no longer need to recognize each other because they are always in prox-
imity during the interactions, the benefits accrue immediately, and thus avoid 
discounting, and memory is not needed because individuals can leave when 
their partner cheats.
4.3. Cognitive Constraints on Harassment 
Like mutualism and kin-biased cooperation, harassment does not suffer from 
the same cognitive limitations as reciprocity and punishment, primarily be-
cause of the brief time delay between imposed costs and potential coopera-
tion. Harassment does not require individual recognition because individu-
Figure 2. Species comparison of temporal discounting. Although the actual form of 
the discounting function is debated (Frederick et al. 2002, Kacelnik 2003), the value of 
a delayed reward decreases with the time to receiving the reward. Plotting estimated 
hyperbolic functions for pigeons and rats (Mazur 1987, Richards et al. 1997) and indi-
vidual data points for tamarins and marmosets (Stevens et al. 2005) shows very high 
levels of impulsivity. The value of a reward decreases by 50% in the first 2–6 s. In con-
trast, humans show parallel reductions in value in months rather than seconds (Rach-
lin et al. 1991). Note that there are a number of important differences between the hu-
man and nonhuman studies including the reward currency (money versus food) and 
experimental techniques (hypothetical situations versus operant training).
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als need not interact repeatedly; harassment can elicit cooperation between 
perfect strangers. Temporal discounting plays a minor role because harass-
ers receive immediate benefits to offset their own costs of harassing. In addi-
tion, eliminating the time delay removes limitations associated with memory. 
Although harassment is less well studied than the other forms of cooperation, 
we predict that it occurs frequently in the animal kingdom given its weak de-
mands on psychological capacities and its utility in reaping benefits at a small 
cost.
5. Conclusions
Several different models have solved the adaptive paradox posed by cooper-
ative behavior; here, we have reviewed mutualism, kin selection, reciprocity, 
and sanctioning. Though empirical evidence for mutualism and kin-biased co-
Figure 3. Species comparison of memory. Comparisons of memory across species is 
probably even more problematic than discounting, again because of methodological 
differences. Stumptail macaques (Macaca arctoides) and pigeons show fairly steep de-
creases in memory retention in binary delayed matching-to-sample tasks (Jarrad & 
Moise 1970, Wixted & Ebbesen 1991). Although not a perfectly analogous compari-
son, face recognition tasks in humans show a much longer retention interval (Wixted 
& Ebbesen 1991).
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operation is widespread, reciprocity occurs relatively infrequently among non-
human animals. Many of the current studies on sanctioning in animals are bet-
ter explained by harassment models than by punishment models. We propose 
that a unique feature of reciprocity and punishment can explain this mismatch 
between the models and the data: Individuals must balance the costs and ben-
efits of repeated interactions over periods of delay. Balancing costs and bene-
fits over time poses several cognitive challenges, and therefore the emergence 
of reciprocity and punishment faces nontrivial psychological constraints. Here 
we focus on the possible role of individual recognition, temporal discounting, 
and memory as specific constraints on reciprocity and punishment. This is by 
no means an exhaustive list of abilities required to implement these strategies. 
Instead, this approach raises important questions about the nature of coopera-
tion. What other abilities does cooperation require? Does incorporating these 
constraints lead to more predictive power in models of cooperation? How do 
psychological and evolutionary prerequisites interact to allow the implemen-
tation of reciprocal and punishment strategies? How do these and other factors 
influence not only animal cooperation but also the ontogeny of cooperation in 
our own species?
Knowing that a variety of psychological mechanisms facilitate cooperation 
allows us to design more appropriate experiments. Investigations of reciproc-
ity and punishment must first evaluate the limitations of animals in the areas 
we have described, as well as others. What are the recognition abilities, dis-
counting rates, memory features, numerical discrimination abilities, and learn-
ing rates of the species being investigated? For example, given evidence of lim-
its on number discrimination (Dehaene 1997, Gallistel 1990, Hauser 2000), it 
makes little sense to set up payoff matrices that entail nondiscriminable alter-
natives. When testing reciprocity and punishment, researchers must first con-
sider the cognitive constraints operating in the target animal and, based on this 
analysis, design an appropriate experiment.
We emphasize that the cognitive constraints discussed in this paper pose a 
challenging hurdle to the evolution of reciprocity and punishment but not an 
insurmountable barrier. Instances abound of extraordinary cognitive adapta-
tions narrowly tailored to specific behavioral routines, overcoming the more 
general cognitive limitations. For instance, Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga co-
lumbiana) stash several thousand seeds each fall, foregoing the opportunity of 
immediate consumption in favor of future benefits. This behavior is grossly 
inconsistent with the typical rate of temporal discounting in nonhuman ani-
mals, implicating a specific cognitive adaptation bypassing a more general con-
straint. The nutcracker also depends on extraordinary spatial memory, which 
greatly facilitates its capacity to retrieve stashed food from thousands of hiding 
locations several months later (Balda & Kamil 1992, Kamil et al. 1994). These 
impressive cognitive adaptations enable a single, specific behavioral routine. 
By analogy, we should expect to find reciprocity and punishment in instances 
where adaptation has overcome the initial cognitive constraints—where nar-
rowly tailored cognitive mechanisms have evolved to support specific behav-
ioral routines.
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An exception to this pattern, gratifyingly, seems to prove the rule. In hu-
mans, reciprocity and punishment commonly occur across a broad array of so-
cial interactions (Camerer 2003, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Fehr et al. 2002, Gurven 
2004, Ostrom & Walker 2003, Ostrom et al. 1992). Far from being narrowly tai-
lored to specific behavioral routines, reciprocity and punishment are broad and 
flexible strategies that can be applied to novel circumstances. Traditional, ulti-
mate models fail to explain the ubiquity of cooperation among humans, where 
factors like population size, migration rates, frequency of interaction, and the 
cost-benefit structure of social interaction play the key roles in constraining or 
enabling reciprocity and punishment. By these measures, nothing about hu-
mans is very unique. Factoring in the role of cognitive constraints, however, 
helps explain the uniqueness of human cooperative behavior. In important 
ways, human cognition differs from nonhuman cognition and may pose fewer 
constraints on the emergence of reciprocity and sanctioning. For instance, rats, 
pigeons, and even nonhuman primates devalue rewards postponed by just a 
few seconds; to see this kind of discounting function in humans requires ex-
tending choices over months rather than seconds (Figure 2; Mazur 1987, Rach-
lin et al. 1991, Richards et al. 1997, Stevens et al. 2005). As a result, humans do 
not need to evolve narrowly tailored exceptions to their general rate of tempo-
ral discounting because it does not impose a severe constraint on reciprocity 
or punishment. Other features of human cognition that may enable reciprocity 
and punishment include face recognition and episodic memory, allowing for 
specific social interactions to be recalled; language, allowing for the negotiation 
of threats and promises and for facilitated bookkeeping by tagging cooperators 
and cheaters with symbols or labels; and theory of mind, allowing for infer-
ences of intent and motivation in social exchange. Although some of these cog-
nitive capacities are shared in part or in whole with nonhuman animals, oth-
ers appear unique to humans. In his original formulation of reciprocity, Trivers 
(1971) emphasized the myriad cognitive abilities that humans may use to im-
plement reciprocal strategies. We, however, disagree with Trivers’ suggestion 
that these abilities evolved after reciprocity as regulating mechanisms. Instead, 
we concur with Darwin (1872) and Williams (1966) in that reciprocity requires 
the existence of these faculties before it can evolve.
Why have no other species evolved these mechanisms to allow reciprocity? 
The effort poured into the theoretical analyses of reciprocity may not reflect its 
frequency in the wild. Animals may not face altruistic situations in which they 
interact repeatedly with nonkin. Many instances of cooperation that appear al-
truistic may, instead, provide immediate mutualistic benefits such as the raven 
food-calling example. Similarly, individuals interact with genetic relatives so 
often that kinship may drive the majority of their social situations (e.g., vam-
pire bat blood sharing). With few opportunities for reciprocity to provide bene-
fits, selection may have been too weak to overcome cognitive constraints.
Mutualism, kin selection, reciprocity, and sanctioning elegantly explain 
how we can reconcile cooperative behavior against the Darwinian maxim 
that selection favors behavior that maximizes personal gains in terms of sur-
vival and reproduction. Developed in response to an adaptive paradox, how-
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ever, these models have long neglected the role of mechanistic constraints. In-
tegrating animal psychology into current models of cooperative behavior can 
help explain the curious taxonomic distribution of reciprocity and punishment, 
which are rare among nonhuman animals but ubiquitous among humans. We 
have touched upon a few of the possible cognitive constraints on cooperation, 
and eagerly anticipate future research to expand and clarify the role of others.
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